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Abstract
The wage premium for high-skilled workers in the United States, measured as
the ratio of the 90th-to-10th percentiles from the wage distribution, increased
by 20 percent from the 1970s to the late 1980s. A large literature has emerged to
explain this phenomenon. A leading explanation is that skill-biased technolog-
ical change (SBTC) increased the demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled
labor. In a calibrated vintage capital model with heterogenous labor, this pa-
per examines whether SBTC is likely to have been a major factor in driving
up the wage premium. Our results suggest that the contribution of SBTC is
very small, accounting for about 1/20th of the observed increase. By contrast,
a gradual and very modest shift in the distribution of human capital across
workers can easily account for the large observed increase in wage inequality.
Keywords: Wage premium, skill-biased technical change, vintage capital, het-
erogenous labor supply
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11 Introduction
The wage premium in the United States, which can be dened as the ratio of the wages
paid to high-skilled workers relative to wages paid to low-skilled workers, underwent
dramatic changes during the 1980s. Figure 1 displays the 90-10 wage premium (wage
ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile) for hourly workers using two
separate data sources: the CPS May/ORG and the State of Working America. From
the gure, the data can be be broken down into three separate periods, characterized
as low, transition, and high. Both data sources suggest a low wage premium period
from 1973 to 1980, with the 90-10 wage premium approximately equal to 3.45 and
3.62 respectively. The next few years can be regarded as a transition period. The
CPS May/ORG suggests this period extended from 1981 to 1985 while the State of
Working America suggests it extended from 1981 to 1988, with the average 90-10 wage
premium equal to 3.98 and 4.08, respectively. For the high wage premium period,
CPS May/ORG indicates a period from 1986 to 2005 and State of America from 1989
to 2005, with the average 90-10 wage premium equal to 4.36 and 4.35, respectively.
Over the past twenty years, a large literature has attempted to explain this increase
in the wage premium. Among the major explanations for this change are shifts in
the supply of and demand for skills, the increased volume of international trade and
the erosion of labor market institutions { including labor unions and the minimum
wage { that protected the earnings of low/medium-wage workers. Perhaps the most
prominent of these is the one that involves Skill-Biased Technological Change (SBTC
hereafter). SBTC induces a shift in production technology that favors skilled over
unskilled labor, essentially increasing the relative productivity of skilled labor and,
therefore, its relative demand.
Katz and Murphy (1992) argue that a simple supply and demand framework can
explain the dynamics of the wage premium: \A smooth secular increase in the relative
demand for college graduates combined with the observed uctuations in the rate of
growth of relative supply could potentially explain the movements in the college wage
2NOTE: The 90-10 wage premium is the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentiles of
hourly wages based on: CPS data in May/ORG [see Autor, Katz, and Kearney
(2008) for details] and the State of Working America 2006-2007, Table 3.4 using
CPS wage data.
Figure 1: 90-10 Wage Premium
3premium from 1962 to 1987." They suggest that the wage premium dropped during
the 1970s because the supply of skilled workers exceeded demand in the baby boom
period. In the 1980s, the wage premium increased dramatically, possibly due to an
acceleration of skill-biased technological change that increased the demand for skilled
labor at a faster pace than the increase in the supply of skilled labor during this
period.
A large literature has emerged that supports SBTC as the principal factor con-
tributing to the rise of wage inequality. Bound and Johnson (1992) examine changes
in wage structure in the 1980s in the United States and conclude that the major cause
may have been SBTC in production technology. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994)
argue that SBTC accounts for a large fraction of the skill upgrading which they have
observed in manufacturing. They conclude that SBTC has been an important source
of the outward shift in the demand for educated/skilled labor, and constitutes the
main reason for the increase in the wage premium.
Krueger (1993) shows that workers who use computers on their job earn roughly
a 10-15 percent higher wage rate, which suggests a strong impact of computers on
the structure of wages. Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) examine the conribution of
SBTC, as measured by computerization, to the widening of U.S. educational wage
dierentials in the 1980s. They show that the rate of skill upgrading has been greater
in more computer-intensive industries.
Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (KORV 2000) focus on an explanation
for the wage premium associated with investment-specic technological change and
capital-skill complementarity in production. They claim that the growth in the stock
of capital equipment will increase the marginal product of skilled labor and hence
raise its relative demand. In other words, the economy's ever-improving technology
requires an ever more highly skilled workforce, and this pushes up the wages of high-
skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers.
Acemoglu (2003) claims that international trade induced SBTC. The trade expla-
nation suggests that the U.S. skill premium increased because trade with skill-scarce
4less-developed countries (LDCs) raised the demand for skilled Americans.1 The open-
ing of trade can induce skill-biased technical change, resulting in a rise in the relative
prices of skill-intensive workers in the United States|without the usual intervening
mechanism of standard trade models.
Other research has attempted to provide evidence suggesting that both supply-
demand shifts and SBTC are weak explanations for the changes in wage inequality.
Card and DiNardo (2002) review the evidence for the SBTC hypothesis, focusing on
the implications of SBTC for overall wage inequality and for changes in wage dif-
ferentials between groups. They show that the evidence linking wage inequality to
SBTC is surprisingly weak, and that SBTC fails to explain the evolution of the other
dimensions of wage inequality, including gender and racial wage gaps and the age
gradient in the return to education. Lemieux (2006) points out that residual inequal-
ity actually declined in periods other than the 1980s. For technological change to be
a key driver of the wage premium, it is necessary to argue that while technological
change was biased in favor of skilled workers during the 1980s, it was biased in favor
of unskilled workers at other times.
Using a semi-parametric estimation procedure. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(1996) nd quantitative evidence that de-unionization and supply-demand shocks
were important factors in explaining the rise in wage inequality from 1979 to 1988.
In addition, the decline in the real value of the minimum wage explains a substantial
role. They conclude that labor market institutions are as important as supply-demand
considerations in explaining changes in the U.S. wage distribution from 1979 to 1988.
Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001) also show that de-unionization amplies the
direct eect of skill-biased technical change by removing the wage compression im-
posed by unions.
Lemieux (2006) concludes that the rise of residual inequality in the 1980s was
an episodic event accounted for by the declining value of the minimum wage and
1Others have suugested that the increased volume of international trade between skill-scarce,
less-developed countries and skill-abundant, developed economies may have put downward pressure
on the wages of low-skilled workers in the United States. [See Wood (1995) and Leamer (1996).]
5that an apparent increase since the mid-1980s reects the mechanical eects of the
changing composition of the labor force (associated with increases in education and
experience). But the matter is far from settled. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008)
argue that there is limited support for \revisionist" claims that the increase in U.S.
wage inequality since 1980 was \episodic," and that uctuations in the real minimum
wage do not constitute a plausible explanation. Instead, they nd evidence in support
of the view that increases in the relative demand for skills { attributable to SBTC {
and a sharp deceleration in the supply of college workers in the 1980s do an excellent
job of capturing the evolution of the college/high school wage premium.
This paper takes a dierent approach toward accounting for the observed increase
in wage inequality in the United States. It relies on a calibrated vintage capital
model with a heterogenous workforce in which economic growth results from both dis-
embodied and embodied technological progress.2 Disembodied technological change
induces productivity improvements in all production processes symmetrically. Em-
bodied technological progress introduces productivity gains that are vintage-specic
and therefore have the potential to induce a greater wage premium as the demand
for more skilled workers to operate the more recent technology increases. It seems to
us that this model provides a natural framework for studying the issues at hand.
A key feature of the model is the heterogeneity of the workforce and the assign-
ment of workers to production processes employing certain vintages of capital. The
workforce is characterized by a skill distribution that is calibrated to match the 90-10
wage distribution. A matching rule, whereby the \best workers" are matched with
the latest technology, is assumed.3 Importantly, we relax a common assumption in
the SBTC literature (see, for example, KORV), which is that there is no substitution
between high- and low-skilled workers in production. Consider, for example, what
2This model is developed in Marquis and Trehan (2007) and examined in more detail in Tantivong
(2009), from which the arguments in this paper are taken.
3This matching rule is consistent with the rule that Jovanovic (1998) identies as being both
plausible and empirically well-founded. In this model, it also results in the most ecient labor
allocation. For example, any other mix of labor and capital lowers output, holding labor and capital
xed.
6happens when an increase in embodied technological progress raises the productivity
of workers associated with the latest technology and thereby increases the demand for
highly skilled workers. In our model, this greater demand is met by shifting relatively
less-skilled workers into the production process employing the latest technology. This
shift has the eect of mitigating the wage premium.
Also unlike the typical SBTC model, our model allows for new technology to
eventually permeate the entire workforce, eventually benetting all workers. It seems
to us that making use of new technologies, while it may require a new and dierent set
of skills, does not necessarily require skills that are are more dicult to master than
the skills required to operate older technologies. The technology eventually lters
throughout the workplace and benets all workers.4 This argument is consistent with
Aghion's (2002) notion of Major Technological Change, and particularly the new
General Purpose Technologies in communication and information that have recently
diused throughout the workforce of industrialized economies.
The model is used rst to examine whether a secular shift from disembodied to
embodied technological progress (that is consistent with the overall rate of economic
growth) is a plausible explanation for the sizable increase in the 90-10 wage premium
that occurred in the United States during the 1980s. The results suggest that it is
not, in that the increase in the wage premium predicted by the model is much too
modest, approximately 1/20th of that observed in the data. The paper then turns
to the supply side of the labor market and asks whether supply-driven factors could
plausibly account for the widening wage premium. The results indicate that they are
indeed good candidates. Only a gradual and modest shift in the skill distribution
of the workforce easily produces a steepening of the wage gradient across worker
categories sucient to account for the observed secular change in the wage premium.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model that
incorporates a heterogeneous workforce into a vintage capital model and derives the
4The technology of bar codes used at checkout in retail stores is a good example of productivity-
enhancing technology that does note require sophisticated training to employ.
7equilibrium balanced growth path. Section 3 presents the calibration of the model.
Section 4 shows that a shift in the source of technological progress towards embodied
technology leads to only a modest increase in the 90-10 wage premium, one that is far
below what was observed in the U.S. during the 1980s. Section 5 demonstrates how
only gradual and modest shifts in the skill distribution of the workforce are required
to account for the observed changes in wage inequality. The last section summarizes
the ndings and suggests directions for future research.
2 A Vintage Capital Model with Heterogenous La-
bor
The theoretical model contains two sources of growth. The rst source is improve-
ments in disembodied technology, which aects all production processes symmetri-
cally. The second source is improvements in embodied technology, which dierentially
aects productivity across the production processes by determining the quality of the
newest vintage. The number of vintages in the economy is assumed to be xed, and
enforced by an exogenous scrappage rule. After the latest embodied technology is
introduced, the oldest vintage of capital is sold for scrap. This results in a schedule
of prices for capital goods that declines with vintage.
2.1 Production with Vintage Capital
Output in the economy can be produced from a number of production processes that
are distinctly identied by the vintage of capital that they utilize. Each production
process is aected by the same economy-wide disembodied technology, denoted t.
We denote the vintage of capital employed by each production process by the index
j = 1;:::;T, where T is the number of vintages in the economy. The newest vintage
of capital in production at date t is represented by K1
t and the oldest by KT
t . The













1 ;  2 (0;1); j = 1;:::;T (1)
where At j is the vintage-specic level of embodied technology that is matched with
the total human capital, HJ
t , or quality-adjusted labor utilized in vintage j at date t.
Note that fewer high-skilled workers are required to attain a given level of H
j
t than
would be the case for lower skilled workers. Therefore, the total hours worked assigned
to any particular production process depends on both the embodied technological
progress and the average skill level of a particular group of workers, whose composition
is endogenously determined.
The two sources of long-run productivity growth are the gross growth rate of
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To render the model stationary, a useful normalization was chosen, which we now










; j = 1;:::;T (4)
where the newest vintage of capital is normalized on the current level of disembodied
technology and the level of embodied technology associated with the oldest vintage


















































i=0Gt i  1. The relative level of embodied technology between the jth vintage
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T
t = 1 (11)
where  
j
t can be interpreted as the \quality gradient" in capital across vintages. The
more rapid is the pace of embodied technological progress, the steeper is the quality
gradient.
Hence the gross growth rate of the economy at date T is represented as Gt, which






There are P workers in the economy. The human capital of the workers in the
economy is distributed along the unit interval that is indexed by x, with x 2 [0;1].
The human capital of each worker with index x is denoted by h(x) where the most
highly skilled workers have an index of x = 0 and a human capital level of h(0), and
the least-skilled workers have an index of x = 1 and a human capital level of h(1).
Households face a time constraint for their labor-leisure decision. For each worker,
the time constraint is zt+lt  1, where zt is the fraction of time devoted to labor and
lt is the fraction of time devoted to leisure. The household's total leisure time for all
workers is given by Lt = Plt. Hence, the total time allocated to labor is:
Pzt = P   Lt (13)
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where zt(x) is the cumulative distribution of human capital per capita employed at
date t. The total number of hours worked by workers assigned to capital of vintage












t ]; j = 1;:::;T (15)
2.3 Household Optimization
Households own the capital goods whose prices are determined as in Lucas (1978).
The representative household selects contingent group employment decision rules







t ; j = 1;:::;T that determine the amount of quality-adjusted labor that
is being oered to the rm. The precise \partitioning" of the workforce is an equi-
librium outcome with the rms setting demand schedules for human capital assigned
11to each vintage according to the \matching rule" of \best workers" with the \best
machines."5 The household also makes consumption-saving, labor-leisure, and capital










tU(ct;Lt); j = 1;:::;T (16)
where ct is the household's consumption, fK
jt
j+1gT is the household's capital holdings
whose values are given at date t = 0 when the optimization is conducted.































t;  2 (0;1) (17)
To purchase consumption and investment goods, the household combines its cap-
ital income (where R
j
t is the rental rate on a unit of the jth vintage of capital), its
labor income (where W
j
t is the wage rate per unit of quality-adjusted labor|or hu-
man capital|assigned to the jth production process) and the revenue from the sale
of capital holdings (where p
j
t is the market price of the jth vintage of capital at date t,
and  is the depreciation rate). Note that investment in the newest vintage of capital,
K1
t+1, will be rented to the rm in period t + 1.
The household's labor supply decisions are further constrained by its total avail-




















t ] = 1 (19)
The household also faces a time resource constraint:





The household's problem is normalized with 
t 1, where normalized consump-































t = 1; j = 0;:::;(T   1) (21)
These Euler equations take the form of asset pricing equations for the various
vintages of capital. There is no investment in vintage T, since it is scrapped at the
end of the period. The wage rate paid per unit of human capital (quality-adjusted
labor) is the same across all worker groups, that is:
~ w
j
t = ~ w
j+1
t ; j = 1;:::;T (22)








t = ztPULt (23)
2.4 Firm's Optimization
The rm is assumed to be competitive in factor and product markets. It hires quality-
adjusted units of labor and rents physical capital of all vintages from households. The
rm matches the most highly skilled workers with the latest vintage capital and pays
the workers who are assigned to work with the same vintage capital the same wage.































; j = 1;:::;T (24)
The rst-order condition for the rm's problem set the rental rate on capital and the


































(1 ) = ~ w
j
t; j = 1;:::;T (26)
Note that from the matching rule, the rm will wish to allocate more human capital
to vintages that possess a higher level of embodied technology. This eect is more
pronounced as the quality gradient steepens.
2.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the goods market consists of transforming output goods along with
the scrapped capital of vintage T|the sum of which is dened as normalized output
and denoted ~ yt|into consumption and new investment, or

























where ~ it = Gt+1 ~ K
j
t+1 is normalized investment. Given the exogenous scrappage rule,
the undepreciated portion of the oldest vintage of capital is sold at the end of the
period for a unit price of pT
t , which is a linear projection of the equilibrium schedule












The evolution of the normalized stock of capital is given by:
~ K
j+1




Since this paper is interested in examining the increase in the wage premium that
occurred during the 1980s (see Figure 1 and Table 1), the exercises described in the
next section are based on a benchmark model calibrated to match the initial \low
level" 90-10 wage premium that prevailed over the 1973 to 1980 period.
Table 1: The Average 90-10 Wage Premium
CPS State of
Periods May/ORG Working America
Low Level 3.4542 3.6319
Transition 3.9787 4.0836
High Level 4.3610 4.3483
NOTE: The time periods for the CPS May/ORG data are 1973-1980 (Low), 1981-
1985 (Transition), and 1986-2005 (High). The time periods for the State of Working
America data are 1973-1980 (Low), 1981-1988 (Transition), and 1989-2005 (High).
This calibration takes as given the stock of human capital in the economy based
on the estimated distribution of Abowd, Legermann, and McKinney (2002). Their
estimates are based on the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Pro-
gram data for 1992.6 An exponential distribution function that ts their data well is
estimated to be:
h(x) = S0e
(1 x); S0; > 0 (30)
with the values of S0 = 8:92 and  = 2:187.7 Based on this distribution, the total
6These data cover California, Illinois, Michigan, and North Carolina for the rst quarter, and
include over 400,000 observations. See Abowd, Lengermann, and McKinney (2002), Table 9.
7The empirical model was estimated to be Lhc = 9:21+0:0219Pe, where Lhc denotes the log of
the dollar value of human capital and Pe denotes the percentile of the human capital distribution.
The equation had an adjusted-R2 of 0.98.
15value of human capital in the economy was then computed.
Holding the stock of human capital in the economy xed, the values of S0 and
 required to match the \low level" 90-10 wage premium were then estimated using
the CPS May/ORG and State of Working America data. These values are reported,
along with the other parameter values for the calibration, in Table 2. The remainder
of the calibration procedure is described below.
Table 2: Benchmark Parameters




 0:96 CPS 1:6500
 0:083 SState
0 12:1272
 2:4847 State 1:7167
 0:33  G 1:025
NOTE: The superscript CPS represents the values calculated by using the CPS
May/ORG data. The superscript State represents values calculated by using State of
Working America 2006-07 data. S0 and  are calculated at the low level steady-state
of 90-10 wage premium.
A semi-log utility function is assumed that is consistent with extensive-margin
adjustments in the labor market as in Rogerson (1988):
U(~ ct;Lt;
t 1) = ln(
t 1~ ct) + Lt;  > 0 (31)
The number of vintages of capital, T, is set to 12, corresponding to an annual de-
preciation rate of  = 0:083. For this calibration, there are 75 endogenous variables:
Hj;xj;L;z;pj;rj;~ c; ~ Kj; ~ wj; j = 1;:::;12, where the net real rental rate on the jth
vintage of capital is rj = Rj   ; 13 exogenous variables: t j;G; j = 1;:::;12; and
7 parameters: S0;;;;;;P. The selection of S0;; and  are described above.
16Capital's share of income is set to  = 0:33. The population of workers is an exoge-
nous scale variable in the model set to 100. The breakdown of the sources of growth
between disembodied and embodied technology is based on the results of Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), Gilchrist and Williams (2000), and Wilson (2001) who
estimate the contribution of embodied technological progress to lie within the range
of 50 to 70 percent. Therefore, for this calibration, the annualized gross growth rate
of the economy is set to G = 1:025, 60 percent of which is attributed to embodied
technological progress, or t j = 1:015; j = 1;:::;12. The discount factor is set to
 = 0:96 for the annual calibration. A 40-hour workweek is assumed, implying a
value for z = 0:36, which corresponds to a preference parameter in the utility func-
tion of  = 2:4847. The average net rental rate,  rj, is 6.85 percent, or 7.32 percent
when weighted by the capital stock.8 These numbers are broadly consistent with the
long-run average returns reported in Mehra and Prescott (2008).
4 Comparative Statics Results
This section conducts comparative statics exercises to examine whether an increase
in the pace of embodied technological progress can lead to shifts in the relative de-
mand for skilled labor large enough to account for the observed increase in the wage
premium. Contrary to the argument put forward in the SBTC literature, we nd that
this channel does not take us very far. More specically, an increase in the pace of
embodied technological progress can account for no more than 1/20th of the observed
20 percent increase in the 90-10 wage premium. An alternative explanation{changes
in the skill distribution of the workforce{turns out to be more promising. Very modest
shifts in labor supply, with relatively fewer high-skilled workers and relatively more
low-skilled workers, can easily account for the observed increase in wage inequality.
8The average real net rental rate computed by weighting capital is calculated by averaging the










In the theoretical model, technological progress enhances labor productivity and can
increase the wage rate of workers. Those workers assigned to the same vintage of
capital receive the same wage, while those assigned to newer vintages of capital can
receive a boost to their marginal product of labor associated with the latest technol-
ogy. Therefore, workers who are matched with the later vintages of capital benet
the most from a steepening of quality gradient of capital, which results from a secular
shift in the source of economic growth from disembodied to embodied technology.
This tends to raise the wage premium. However, accompanying a steepening of the
quality gradient of capital is an increase in the number of workers matched with newer
vintages. This reallocation of labor (ceteris paribus) tends to reduce the wages at the
high end of the wage distribution, while increasing the wages at the low end, thus
tending to lower the wage premium.
In this rst exercise, we compute the impact on the 90-10 wage premium of a
shift in the source of economic growth from the benchmark 60 percent embodied-40
percent disembodied technology to a 100 percent embodied technology. On balance,
the osetting eects of a steeper quality gradient of capital described above weigh in
favor of an increase in the wage premium. However, this increase is small. Referring
to Table 3, the 90-10 wage premium is seen to increase by only about one percent from
the calibrated low level to the its new steady state, whether we use the CPS May/ORG
data or the State of Working America data for the calibration. By contrast, the data
indicate that the wage premium actually went up by more than 20 percent from the
low level to the high level period.9
We show a second, extreme case, where we assume that the original technology
was 0 percent embodied, but then switches to 100 percent embodied. The wage
premium rises by only 2.23 percent using the CPS May/ORG calibration and by only
2.85 percent using the State of Working America data. Again, the increases in the
9The increase in the 90-10 wage premium is 26.30 percent in the CPS May/ORG data and 20.34
percent in the State of Working America data.
18Table 3: Demand-Driven Shifts in the Wage Premium
90-10 Wage CPS May/ORG State of Working America
Premium 60% Emb 0% Emb 60% Emb 0% Emb
Low Level (Data) 3.453 3.453 3.613 3.613
Expected High Level
(100 % Embodied) 3.476 3.530 3.650 3.716
High Level (Data) 4.361 4.361 4.348 4.348
NOTE: Using the CPS May/ORG data, S0 = 12:651 and  = 1:650 in 60% embodied
and 40% disembodied technology case and S0 = 12:482 and  = 1:671 in 0% embodied
and 100% disembodied technology case. Using the State of Working America data,
S0 = 12:127 and  = 1:717 in the 60% embodied and 40% disembodied technology
case and S0 = 11:938 and  = 1:741 in the 0% embodied and 100% disembodied
technology case.
wage premium indicated by the exercise are far below those observed in the data
between the low level and high level periods.
From the perspective of this model, then, increases in the demand for skilled
labor|arising from increases in the growth rate of embodied technology|do not
appear to be a signicant driver of the observed increase in the wage premium during
the 1980s. The eect is simply too small.
4.2 Supply-Driven Shifts in the Wage Premium
This section examines whether labor supply factors may be able to account for the
dramatic changes in wage inequality that took place in the United States in the
1980s. In particular, it asks: Can plausible shifts in the distribution of human capital
account for the observed changes in inequality? Of course, the skill distribution is
always shifting. However, it is unlikely that large shifts can take place in relatively
short periods of time. Therefore, a supply-driven explanation of the wage premium
associated with a changing skill distribution must be consistent with relatively small
changes in this distribution over time.
19In this exercise, the stationary distribution of human capital from the calibrated
low level states for each of the CPS May/ORG and State of Working America data
sets are altered suciently to match their respective high level states. This is done
by altering the parameters of the human capital distribution, S0 and , in order to
match the high level wage premium while holding xed the overall stock of human
capital.10 The results are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4: Values of S0 and  Required to Match the 90-10 Wage Premium
CPS May/ORG State of Working America
Low Level High Level Low Level High Level
90-10 Wage Premium 3.453 4.361 3.613 4.348
S0 12.651 10.199 12.127 10.228
 1.650 1.985 1.717 1.980
NOTE: The values of S0 and  are calculated for the 60% embodied and 40% disem-
bodied technology case.
Increasing the wage premium by altering the distribution of human capital, while
holding the stock of human capital xed, requires an increase (in absolute value) in
the slope parameter, , and a reduction in S0. The results are reported in Table 4
for the calibration using the CPS May/ORG and the State of Working America data.
To assess whether these changes, shown in Figure 2 for the CPS May.ORG case, are
relatively small and hence feasible, the percent changes in human capital across the
distribution by decile were computed. The results are reported in Table 5, where the
highest skilled workers are in the 0-0.1 decile.
According to the model, the entire increase in the wage premium can be accounted
for by a shift in human capital from the bottom six deciles of the distribution, 0.4-
1.0, to the top four deciles, 0-0.4, with the largest gain occurring in the most highly
10Even though the total stock of human capital in the economy is changing over time, those
changes should not aect the wage premium unless they change the shape of the distribution, i.e.,
its slope.
20Figure 2: Changes Required in the Human Capital Distribution to Match the High
Level 90-10 Wage Premium (based on the CPS May/ORG data).
21skilled group of workers. Quantitatively, this means that the top 10 percent of the
workforce by skill level would experience an increase of 2.04 percent in its share of the
economy's total human capital based on CPS May/ORG data or 1.61 percent based on
the State of Working America data. The largest decline would come from the bottom
10 percent of the workforce by skill level, with its share of the economy's total stock
of human capital declining by just 0.77 percent based on the CPS May/ORG data or
0.60 percent based on the State of Working America data.
Table 5: Change Required in Human Capital Distribution by Decile
CPS May/ORG State of Working America
Change in % Change in Change in % Change in
Percentile Human Capital Human Capital Human Capital Human Capital
0-0.1 23.72 2.04 18.74 1.61
0.1-0.2 13.35 1.15 10.48 0.90
0.2-0.3 5.78 0.50 4.47 0.38
0.3-0.4 0.35 0.03 0.20 0.02
0.4-0.5 -3.43 -0.30 -2.76 -0.24
0.5-0.6 -5.97 -0.51 -4.73 -0.41
0.6-0.7 -7.57 -0.65 -5.95 -0.51
0.7-0.8 -8.47 -0.73 -6.63 -0.57
0.8-0.9 -8.87 -0.76 -6.91 -0.60
0.9-1.0 -8.90 -0.77 -6.91 -0.60
NOTE: The total stock of human capital in the economy is held xed at the computed
value of 1,161.21.
While the full explanation for the observed changes in wage inequality in the
United States is not to be found in the shifting distribution of the economy's human
capital, these estimates suggest that even modest changes in the skill distribution of
the workforce could have very large eects on the wage premium.
225 Conclusions
This paper proposes an alternative approach to identifying the principal causes of the
observed changes in income inequality in the United States. A vintage capital model
is a natural framework for examining how new technology aects labor demand. This
approach suggests that, absent frictions (such as retraining costs that may be required
for workers to acquire the skills that are necessary to work with new technology), it
is unlikely that an acceleration in the rate of technological advance alone can explain
large movements in wage inequality. By contrast, factors that alter the skill distri-
bution of the workforce appear to be a promising avenue of future research, since
relatively small changes in the skill distribution can have large eects on the wage
premia. Such factors could include immigration, population growth, or deciencies
in the educational system in failing to provide job-relevant training. At the high end
of the skill distribution, endogenous increases in human capital may be taking place
in locations such as Silicon valley. A particularly attractive avenue of future research
would be to examine these issues within the context of a heterogeneous workforce
where the distribution, and perhaps the level, of human capital is endogenously de-
termined as the outcome of changing opportunities associated with the introduction
of new technology and new goods into the economy.
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